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\VATSOX 
In Bank. 
'l'Hl1J v. PHILIP 
Witnesses-Cross-examination-Scope.~ The scope 
examination should be confined to matters which 
elicited from the witness on direct examination. 
§ 
C.2d 
cross-
been 
Civ. 
!d.-Cross-examination-Latitude Allowed.-The chief object 
of cross-examination is to test the knowledge and 
recollection of the witness, and it should be wide lati-
particularly in cases involving a witness a de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution. 
!d.-Cross-examination-Bringing Out Entire Conversation.-
'Vhere a witness testified as to part of a conversation on direct 
examination, then on cross-examination the whole of the con-
versation may be elicited, at least so far as it is germane. 
[4] !d.-Cross-examination-Bringing Out Entire Transaction.-
The mere fact that an officer in a homicide case testified on 
direct examination about certain phases of his inspection of an 
apartment, his observations of deceased's body and his conver-
sation with defendant does not authorize an unrestricted line 
of cross-examination of anything that he may have heard from 
third persons while he was in the apartment; such remarks 
and comments, being in the nature of unsworn statements made 
by various third persons who had not been called as witnesses, 
and who had merely inspected the premises and expressed 
their personal views or opinions, were inadmissible hearsay and 
not proper cross-examination. 
[5] Criminal Law-Instructions-Witnesses.-Where the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case called several witnesses to testify to 
the degree of t·igor nw1·tis in deceased's body when 
they saw it, an instruction that neither side was required to 
produce all witnesses who might be able to testify to that par-
ticular fact was proper, since otherwise there would be a 
repetitious recital of testimony which would prolong the trial 
Sec Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 77; Am.Jur., 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 76; Am.Jur., 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 
~ 133; 41 
Criminal Law, § 894; 
§1432; 10] §120(2); Witnesses, 
Criminal § 1341(5); [13] Criminal Law, § 1377. 
[10 
[11 
[12 
819 
would bave 
Id.~Instrnctions~Circumstantial Evidence.-~In 
conclusion. 
prop<·r to instrud that where the 
or two constructions it the 
to dP:!:endant's 
circumstantial evidence is Telied 
a the facts 
be entirely (:onsistent with the 
be inconsistent with any other rational 
Id.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-In a case which 
rests on circumstantial evidence, it is error to refuse 
an instrudion that each fact which is essential to complete 
a chain of circumstances that will establish defendant's 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
!d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Circumstantial 
Evidence.-In a case resting entirely on circumstantial evi~ 
the court's failure to an instruction that eaeh fact 
essential to eomplete the chain of circumstances against de-
fendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt did not 
result in a miscarriage of justice within the purview of Const., 
art. VI, § 47~, where the jury was correetly instructed on the 
doctrine of reasonable doubt, the law applicable where evidence 
is susceptible of different constructions, the principle that cir-
cumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt must be inconsistent 
with any other rational hypothesis, and other related matters. 
Witnesses-Cross-examination-Defendants in Criminal Cases. 
-Where a defendant takes the stand and makes a general 
denial of the crime with which he is charged, the permissible 
scope of cross-examination iR very wide. 
[10] !d.-Cross-examination-Defendants in Criminal Cases.-
·where defendant had bl'en questioned on direct examination 
about his background and specifically with regard to his edu-
cation, in response to which he related his graduation from 
high school, his one semester of college and his training with 
the Maritime Service, he eould properly be cross-examined as 
to his attendance at radio-television classes. 
[11] Id.- Cross-examination- Collateral Matters.- Defendant's 
cross~examination on collateral matters having no purpose 
other than to degrade him, such as casting aspersions on his 
reasons for wearing an Army uniform that he was entitled to 
wear, and offering evidence to show an attempt to a dis-
charge from the Army, was improper. 
[12] Criminal Law--Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-
Miscarriage of Justice.-A "miscarriage of justice," within the 
S20 PEOPLE V. WATSON [46 C.2d 
should be declared when 
after an examination of the entire case, including 
is of the opinion that it is probable 
that a result more favorable to tbe appealing would have 
been reached in the absence of the error. 
[13] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Cross-exami-
nation.-In a homicide case, error in permitting the cross-
examination of defendant as to certain acts not relevant to 
issue in the case did not result in a miscarriage of justice, 
he gave an explanation of both acts designed to remove 
any derogatory effect that otherwise might have resulted from 
the prosecution's inquiry, where it did not appear reasonablv 
probable that the jury was influenced by such evidence to d~­
fendant's prejudice or that the admission of such evidence 
affected the verdict, and where it was not reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable to defendant would have been 
reached in the absence of error in refusing to give an addi-
tional instruction relating to circumstantial evidence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Twain Michelsen, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree murder, affirmed. 
Leslie C. Gillen, Gregory S. Stout and William F. Cleary 
for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Victor Griffith and John S. 
Mcinerny, Deputy Attorneys General, Thomas C. Lynch, Dis-
trict Attorney (San Francisco), and Cecil F. Poole, Assistant 
District Attorney, for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of con-
viction of second degree murder. His wife, Arlys Watson, 
was killed on February 15, 1953, in their San Francisco 
apartment. Defendant's conviction rests on circumstantial 
evidence. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the conviction, but he argues these points 
as grounds for reversal: (1) the restriction of the defense's 
cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses, Officer 
Mullen; (2) the giving of an instruction that neither the 
prosecution nor the defense was required to call as witnesses 
all persons present "at the events involved in the evidence"; 
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the of an instrnction requiring, in substance, 
essential fact in a chain of circumstantial must 
a reasonable doubt; and ( 4) the overruling 
obiectiou to certain cross-examination defendant. 
and { 4) raise any serious question, but a 
of the records leads us to the conclusion there 
no prejudicial error resulting in a of 
" and the of be 
art. VI, § 
defendant was 26 and his was 
He was then an corporal, stationed in San Fran-
and was due to be discharged on March 19, 1953. The 
were married in J nne, 1952, and lived in an upstairs 
furnished apartment. Apparently there was no particular 
friction between them. 
February 15, 1953, was a Sunday. At 7 :00 that evening 
utLL~:::uul:t''"' telephoned to the police that he had just found 
his wife dead in their apartment. Officer Mullen was the 
:first official at the scene. Defendant met him there and took 
him to the bathroom, where he found Arlys lying in the 
bathtub, with her ·Iegs bent in a jack-knife position and with 
her head partially submerged, although neither the nose nor 
mouth was under water. Officer Mullen noted a red-brown 
about 4 or 5 inches wide that ran down the back of the 
tub (from top of Arlys' head into the water) and the 
water was bloody. The bathroom walls were clean and the 
was dry. He noticed that the body was rigid, and he 
no effort to remove it from the tub. He saw black and 
blue marks on the deceased's :fingers but no wounds on the 
body. He noted that the bed was unmade but that everything 
else in the bedroom seemed to be in order. Defendant ap-
nervous. 
Shortly after Officer Mullen's arrival, Inspectors Flynn 
and Thompson reached the scene, followed by ambulance 
Hynes and ambulance steward Zielinsky. The latter 
two, after removing the deceased from the tub to a mat on 
bathroom floor, made a brief examination of the body. 
Zielinsky testified that the body was very stiff and rigid; 
that there was some bleeding from a matted mass of hair 
in the back of deceased's head but no wounds were visible; 
and that her hands were brnised. He removed a from 
the bed and covered the body. At that time there was a rose-
colored bedspread on the unmade bed. The landlady of the 
822 
"Le~rnrtea that the rose-colored 
but that when the W atsons rented the 
stated that had a bedspread of their own and would 
the rose-colored one on the divan in the room 
and that as February 9, she had seen a 
white on the bed. Defendant not to 
know what had become of this white He stated 
that some two or three months he had burned a 
m the to know of such '"'V'~"'""· 
either he or his wife threw it in the can. It was 
the that defendant had killed 
in the bedroom; that the white had become 
bloodstained and that defendant of 1t before 
called the The white bedspread was not produced. 
Two coroner's deputies next arrived at the and 
the ambulance men departed. After cleaning up the bath-
room, the coroner's men left with the body. Defendant testi-
fied that he then notified the military authorities, but neither 
then nor later did he attempt to communicate with his or his 
wife's parents. He further testified that Officer Mullen told 
him that all there was left for him to do was to appear at 
the coroner's inquest in about six weeks, advised him against 
remaining in the apartment that night, and left. 
About 9:30 that evening the coroner's office re-
the death to Inspector Neider of the homicide detail, 
and shortly thereafter he and Inspector VanDervoort went 
to the v,r atson apartment. The door was locked, and the 
landlady admitted them. The apartment to be in 
order, and there was no evidence of breakage or a forced 
Money was found in the deceased's purse, standing 
on the bureau, and there was no evidence of robbery. Neider 
learned from the Army authorities that defendant was 
ing at a certain downtown hotel, and the two inspectors went 
there. Defendant was not in his room but after searching 
the neighborhood, they found him on the street about 10 :30 
that evening, and they took him to the Hall of Jus-
tice for questioning. The story defendant then told the 
police and during subsequent interrogation, as well as at 
the was substantially the same. He admitted that Sat-
urday night, February 14, 1953, he and wife had a disagree-
ment over the fact that she had sent him a Valentine and 
he had failed to remember her, but he denied that they had 
a serious argument then or at any other time. 
Defendant stated that on the morning of February 15, 
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she ·wanted to take a that 
wanted to clean the house in preparation for an expected 
house who was coming the next week. He stated that 
J,e then went to make the bed, that as he grasped the bed-
his started to bleed again, and he went to get 
n fresh bandage ; that his wife told him that she would take 
('are of the bed; and that he then decided to go out for awhile. 
left the apartment about 12:30 p.m., first taking two 
to a nearby laundromat. He then drove to 
Half Moon Bay, sunned himself on the beach for about half 
nn hour, but left 'vhen it became windy. After his arrest, sand 
was L1iscon'red in defendant's shoes and socks. Defendant 
"1nted that he then went to Sutro's Baths for a swim, using 
own suit. After leaving Sutro defendant 
c,tat(•d that he started toward home, stopping first about 
p.m. at a drugstore to buy his wife a heart-shaped box of 
in view of his Valentine Day oversight next going 
to a bar where he had a couple of beers, then proceeding to a 
store to a pint of ice cream, and finally ar-
home about 7 p.m. The "\Vatsons' normal dinner hour 
\Yas about 8 p.m. on Sundays. 'rhe box of candy and cDrton 
of ice cream vvere found in the kitchen by the police. De-
fendant stated that upon entering his apartment he searched 
for his ·\\'ife and found her in the bathtub; that he started 
to lift her, realized that she was dead, desisted, and then 
the police. The clothing that defendant stated 
was that Sunday-a civilian sports suit-when 
he undertook to remove his wife from the bathtub was found 
at the hotel where he later registered that night; and all 
the clothing, including the jacket, was dry. Defendant stated 
that hP ai(l not get any of his clothing wet at that time. 
824 (46 C.2d 
defendant's alibi, the produced 
of a cab driver that he had seen defendant 
sometime between 12 noon and 1 p.m. that Sunday near a 
certain bar in Daly City. This was on an entirely different 
route from the oue defendant stated that he had taken. 
Another cab driver and also the wife of the bartender testified 
that they had seen defendant near or in the bar at about 1 :30 
p.m. that day. Defendant at all times denied that he had 
been in Daly City on that Sunday. 
It was the theory of the prosecution that defendant 
killed his wife in the bedroom before leaving the apartment 
that Sunday morning; that he then went out to build up an 
elaborate alibi, and hid or made some disposition of the 
bloody bedclothes-the previously mentioned white bedspread 
and a certain yellow blanket which the police learned had 
been in the apartment but which, like the white bedspread, 
was never found; that defendant returned home before 7 p.m., 
cleaned up the apartment to hide the evidence of any struggle, 
and placed his wife in the bathtub to make the death look 
like an accident. 
The building in which the W atsons occupied an upstairs 
apartment was so constructed that the tenant below could 
hear any noises or sounds which might occur above him. 
The tenant testified that on that Sunday morning between 
10, when he arose, and 10 :30, when he left, there was 
no unusual sound from the \Vatson apartment; nor were 
there any unusual sounds between 12:30 and 2 :30 p.m. or 
between 4 :30 and 6 p.m., when he was again in his apart-
ment. Both this tenant and the landlady in the building 
testified that on the preceding Saturday, February 14, they 
heard noises emanating from the Watson apartment, as if 
furniture was being moved. Upon this premise, the prosecu-
tion maintained that the homicide did not occur during the 
recited hours that the tenant below was in his apartment, 
and that the Saturday noises were caused by Mrs. \Vatson's 
cleaning activities that day, with the result that she had no 
reason for staying home Sunday to do the already-completed 
work. A neighbor in adjoining premises testified that some-
time between 10 :30 a.m. and 12 noon that Sunday morning, 
she heard three or more unusual thumping noises coming 
from the \Vatson apartment. No witness testified to hearing 
any screams or shouts from the Watson apartment that Sun-
day morning. 
An autopsy on the deceased's body revealed some lacera-
area 
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distributed in the back and central 
of her head. She had a bruise on her her neck 
was bruised as if she had been choked, and she had a small 
on her chin. There ·were bruises over 
backs of both hands and the character-
them defensive contusions caused when she her 
over her head to ward off the blows as she was struck 
behind. 'l'hcrc 1vas no sknll fracture but there had 
from the head lacerations. The brain 
No 
water vms present in the lungs. 'rhrre was no evidence of a 
attack. Apparently, the death was due to multiple 
injurirs to the head, with contusions and concus· 
sion of the brain caused by use of a heavy blunt instrument. 
The death instrument was never found. 
'l'hc time factor was a Yital element in the case, and the 
presented medical testimony bearing on thii-i 
Two medical experts testified as to their examination 
contents of the deceased's stomach, one fixing the 
death as having occurred one hour, and the other fixing it as 
one to two hours after the last meal had been eaten. As noted 
defendant stated that he and his wife had breakfast 
between 10 and 11 that Sunday morning; and he left the 
apartment about 12 :30 p.m. In relation to the setting~ in of 
mortis, these mPdical experts agreed that eight hours 
after death would be the normal period required for a body 
or the age and condition of deeeased's to reach the state of 
rigidity which had bern described by other witnesses in re-
citing their observations at the time they went to defendant's 
apartment about 7 :30 p.m. that Sunday. Again this would 
fix the tinlC of death as about 11 :30 a.m., which was before 
defendant stated that he left the apartment. ·with r0gard 
to whether the deceas0d's body had long been immersed in 
these medical experts testified that normally skin wrin-
lding in certain areas occurs about one hour after immersion 
and remains present for about 22 to 24 hours. There was no 
skin wrinkling when the body was examined some 17 or 18 
hours after removal ft·om the tub. 
'fhe eivilian doihei-i that dPfendant had worn that Sunday 
were found in tht~ hotel room where lw went that evening. 
[nelu<1ed with this (~lothing was a pair nf so(·k~ stuffed into 
h shoefi. TherP were hloodstailii-i 011 tlH' soles of the soeks~-­
later determined to be both ''A'' and '' 0 '' of blood; 
the deceased's was ''A'' and defendant's was '' 0.'' De-
826 PEOPLE v. WATSON [46 C.2d 
fendant testified that after Officer Mullen left him in the 
apartment, he finished cleaning the bathroom, including some 
of the bloody water that fell on the bathroom floor when the 
body was removed. He did this work in his stocking feet. 
No other bloodstains were found on defendant's clothing. 
On Sunday night, February 15, following defendant's in-
terrogation at the Hall of Justice relative to the homicide, 
defendant was asked to remove his clothes for examination 
of his body. At that time it was observed that defendant 
had some scratches and bruises on his body, apparently recent 
ones and as to which he was only able to give a partial ex-
planation: a bruise on his knee attributed to rifle range 
practice the preceding day, Saturday, and the cut on his right 
index finger resulting from his opening the beer can that 
Sunday morning; but he could not account for scratches 
found on his right forearm and left upper chest. 
Police criminologists and inspectors made several scientific 
examinations of the \V atson apartment, the first being on 
February 16. Numerous small bloodstains were found on 
the east wall of the bedroom (near the bed), which proved 
to be "0" (defendant's) blood. The bedroom rug near that 
same side wall appeared to have been rubbed or washed, but 
was dry; and when sprayed with luminal, that portion of 
the rug indicated the presence of blood. A luminous reaction 
was found between the bed and the east wall of the bedroom, 
going toward the bathroom. No bloodstains were found on 
the bathroom walls. Examination of the living-room furniture 
disclosed a few bloodstains on the undersurface of the divan 
(both "A" and "0" blood). The rose-colored bedspread 
which was found on the bed (though presumably it was 
originally on the divan according to the prosecution's evidence 
as above noted) also contained bloodstains (in the main 
"0" type but also some "A"). 
On the circumstantial evidence which has been summarized, 
the jury returned a verdict of second degree murder. De-
fendant does not contend that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the conviction, but he relies for reversal upon four 
a:-;signments of error. 
First to be considered is defendant's complaint of the 
restriction of the defense's eros~Hxamination of Police Officer 
Mullen. [1] lt is generally reeognized that the scope of 
eross-examination should be eon fined to matters which have 
been elicited from the witness on direct examination. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2048.) The prosecution's objections in the main 
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The re<:onl shows that ap-
pu hl i··· officials PXam iw'd the deeeat;ed 
that •~vt'll hc•iween 7 :F• 
:±5 p.m : Ollie(•!' l\luil<'ll; tlw two a.mbulaJ!(~e men, HynP" 
Zi('linsky; the two poliee inspector;;, l•'lynn and 'l'homp-
son: and th0 1 wo curo1H:r ':;; men. Officer Mullen was the firt;t 
ie(: officer to arrive on the scene, and he remained thert• 
the"e others came and went. Of this group, the 
pros~'<:ution only called the two ambulance men, in addition 
to Ofiieer Mullen, as witnesses. The defense in the main was 
a1i empting to get in the record, through cross-examination 
of Officer Mullen, conversations between Officer Mullen and 
the public officials above mentioned who did not testify at 
the trial; also various comments and remarks that Officer 
l\Iullen may have heard these persons make while they were 
in the apartment. 
[2] 'rhe chief object of cross-examination is to test the 
credibility, knowledge, and recollection of the witness. It 
should be given wide latitude, particularly in cases involving 
" witness against a defendant in a criminal prosecution." 
Cal.Jur. § 76, p. 97; People v. Whitehead, 113 Cal.App. 
2d 43, 48 [247 P.2c1 717] .) [3] Thus, it is undisputed that 
vvhcre a witness testifies as to part of a conversation on direct 
examination, then on cross-examination, the whole of the 
conversation may be elicited, at least so far as it is germane. 
J\Ioreover, section 1854 of the Code of Civil Procedure pro-
Yid(:s: "\Vhen part of an act, declaration, conversation, or 
writing is given in evidence by one party, the ·whole on 
the same subject may be inquired into by the other; ... and 
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing 
is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation 
or writing, vvhich is necessary to make it understood, may 
also be given in evidence.'' This section was applied in 
People v. ·whitehead, supra, in reversing a murder conviction 
beeause of improper limitations imposed in the cross-examina-
tion of a prosecution witness. There the court prohibited 
c·ross-examination of the witness on certain conversation be-
tween the deceased and defendant at the time of the killing, 
a,; to which conversation "no testimony whatsoever was intro-
duced on direct examination." (P. 49.) 'I'his ruling was 
hdd to be erroneous upon the basis of the "verbal act theory," 
that ''physical acts testified to cannot be arbitrarily separated 
from the verbal acts accompanying them and made at the 
same time and place" (p. 49), and so "when testimony has 
PEOPU'i \V ATSON 
\Vhitehcad ease involved a 
of tl1e rule in that the 
tion was to out the conversation between the ue<.:e<•:sen 
and defendant accompanying the commission of the killing. 
the situation differs in that the conversations, com-
ments and remarks which the defense sought to elicit 
Officer Mullen on cross-examination, though they formed no 
of his on direct examination, concerned con-
versations of third persons occurring after, rather than ac-
companying, the happening of the crime. [4] Simply be-
cause Officer Mullen testified on direct examination about 
certain phases of his own inspection of the Watson apart-
ment, his observations of the deceased's body, and his eon-
versation with defendant, does not mean that the door was 
thereby opened to an unrestricted line of cross-examination 
upon anything· that he may have heard from third persons 
while he was in the apartment. These remarks and com-
ments, being in the nature of unsworn statements made by 
various third persons who had not been called as witnesses, 
and who had merely inspected the premises and expressed 
their personal views or opinions, were inadmissible hearsay 
and not proper cross-examination. 
·while defendant makes some general complaint concern-
ing the alleged curtailment of the cross-examination of Officer 
Mullen and other prosecution witnesses, the record does not 
sustain his claim. On the contrary, it appears that the trial 
ecmrt was very liberal in the allowance of the defense's cross-
examination of Officer Mullen, for his direct examination cov-
ered but 14 pages of the transcript while his cross-examination 
covered 80 pages. There were other instances showing the 
liberality of the trial court in allowing cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses: Inspector Neider's direct examination 
covered 86 pages, his cross-examination169 pages; the autopsy 
surgeon's direct examination covered 14 pages, his cross-
examination 163 pages; and another pathologist's direct ex-
amination covered 18 pages ,his cross-examination 185 pages. 
It does not appear that the trial court misapplied the princi-
ples governing the proper limitation of cross-examination, 
but rather that it followed a liberal policy in its rulings. 
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in 
giving an instruction that neither the prosecution nor the 
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who 
shown to have been at any of the events involved 
in the evidence.'' He claims that the should 
called the two and the 
as to their observations 
rnoriis found in the 
arriYal at the \Vatson 
7 :15 and 7 :4?1 m. 
to his own failure 
their would 
D<'frndant takes the position that since 1 hese witnesses 
the it should be presumef! 
their would not have been eorrobon1ti vc of 
account of prosecution \Vitnesses MuUPH ancl ihe two 
ambulance men, Hynes and Zieliusky, but ratller would h::we 
unfavorable to the prosecution's theory. ]<'or this prop-
he cites People Y. Beal, 116 Cal.App.2d 475 P.2d 
, where the prosecuting witness in a rape charge failed 
to produce her exarnining physician, and there was no 
independent proof of the alleged offense other than her own 
testimony, which varied in seYeral material particulars; ancl 
.fldson v. Jnlson, 110 CaLApp.2d 797 [243 P.2d 558], where 
in a divorce action, about ten persons of a group witnessed 
a certain episode, no one of them was called as a witness, 
no explanation \\'HS giYen therefor despite the need for cor-
evidence, and under such circumstances the court 
declared "bound to presume ... that their testimony 
wnnld be unfavorable, and was for that reason snppre~sed. '' 
. 801.) [5] But the present sitnation is not comparable' 
In the cited cases, for the prosecution did call several wit-
Jl(•s•ws as ahon' mentioned to testif~r 1o the drgree of riqor 
Iii Or/is pre.-;e11t in the bod:v when they saw it tllnt 8nnfla.1 
e\·,,nmg. 'l'he instruction that neither side was required to 
al1 \dtnesses who might be able to testify to thai 
pHrticnlar fact has a practical premis0. for otherwise there 
wmllcl he a repetitious recital of testimony ·which \rould pro-
1lw trial beyond veasonahle limits. TJ nder the circum-
stanees, it would seem that defendant's remerly wonld havr: 
lwen to have called the witncssN; on his own behalf if he 
hc·lin·ed their i woul(l have air!ed hi::; (:ause. (Se(~ 
v. Potcc/7, 8:l Cal.App. f)~, 67-G8 [2:JG P. !l6ll.) 
The next qnestion eoncerns i he eourt 's instruetions on 
eircmnstantinl evic1enee. [6] As ahoye stated, this was 
830 PEOPLE V. vV ATSON [46 C.2d 
wholly a circumstantial evidence case, and the court properly 
gave several instructions on the subject: That where the evi-
dence is susceptible of two constructions, it is the jury's 
duty to adopt that construction which points to defendant's 
innocence (CALJIC No. 26); and where circumstantial evi-
dence is relied upon as proof of guilt to justify a conviction. 
the facts or circumstances must not only be entirely " 
>vith the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any 
other rational conclusion ( CALJIC No. 27). (People 
Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 175 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Koenig, 
29 CaL2d 87, 91-93 [173 P.2d 1]; People v. Zerillo, 36 
2d 222, 233 [223 P.2d 223] .) The following related CALJIC 
instructions were also given: No. 21 (presumption of inno-
cence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof) ; No. 24 (direct 
and circumstantial evidence equally entitled to considera-
tion) ; and No. 25 (direct and indirect evidence-code defini-
tions). But the court refused to instruct in language sub-
stantially embodying CALJIC No. 28: That "When the case 
which has been made out by the People against a defendant 
rests entirely or chiefly on circumstantial evidence, and in 
any case before the jury may find a defendant guilty basing 
its finding solely on such evidence, each fact which is essential 
to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the 
defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Defendant argues that it was error for the court to refuse 
to give a requested instruction in language substantially em-
bodying CALJIC No. 28. People v. Bende1·, supra, People 
v. Koenig, supra, and People v. Zerillo, s1tpra, were concerned 
primarily with the court's error in failing to give CAL.TIC 
No. 27, although in the Koenig case the refused instruction 
was extended to include, in part, the principle of CALJIC 
No. 28. In the Zerillo case the error was held reversible 
error but not so in the Bender and Koenig cases. 
In the District Courts of Appeal the adequacy of the 
instructions on the principles governing circumstantial evi~ 
dence cases has been variously handled. Depending on the 
particular record, the court's failure to give more complete 
instructions on the subject was held cause for reversal in 
People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 132-J 56 [J46 P.2d 
469] ; People v. Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465-466 [150 P.2d 
8121, and People v. Tholke, 75 Cal.App.2d 857, 860-861 [171 
P.2c1 904]; but not in People v. Webster, 79 Cal.App.2d 321, 
327-329 [179 P.2d 633], People v. Can'd1:otto, 128 Cal.App.2d 
347, 356-358 [275 P.2d 500], and People v. Perez, 128 Cat 
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~Where the error in the 
the <'Rscntial eonsidera~ 
a proper statement of thr 
that eiretJTIIR1antial fWi\1ence mnst be iueonsistcnt 
any other rational hypothrsis tlmn that of guilt 
(CAL.HC No. 27). CAIJ,JlC No. 28 was held applicable in 
the determination of a circumstantial evidence case in People 
v snpra, People v. Garnier, 95 Cal.App.2d 489, 500 
P.2d 111] ; People v. Candiotto, supra, and People v 
supra; but was deemed "too liberal" in People v. 
103 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [230 P.2d 52]. 'rhe latter 
view was based on the premise that the law only requires that 
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but 
not that each fact in the chain of circumstances-in the 
sense of ''each incident or event inculpating the defendant'' 
--be so proved, citing People v. Nunn, 65 Cal.App.2d 188, 
195 [150 P.2d 476], and People v. Klinkenberg, 90 Cal.App. 
2d 608, 632 [204 P.2d 47, 613]. Moreover the Mansour case 
rested on circumstantial evidence, while in the Nunn and 
Klinkenberg cases the evidence was not wholly circumstantial 
but was largely direct; and "a court is not required to in-
struct upon the rules of law applicable to circumstantial 
evidence which is incidental to and corroborative of direct 
evidence." (People v. Jerman, 29 Cal.2d 189, 197 [173 P.2d 
; see also People Y. Zerillo, supra, 36 Cal.2d 222, 233; 
People v. Hannon, 89 Cal.App.2d 55, 60 [200 P.2d 32]. 
People v. Kross, 112 Cal.App.2d 602, 615 [247 P.2d 441, 
and People v. Edcly, 123 Cal.App.2d 826, 835 [268 P.2d 47], 
follow People v. Mansour, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d 592, 598.) 
[7] Properly interpreted, CALJIC No. 28 applies the 
doctrine of reasonable doubt not to proof of miscellaneous 
collateral or incidental facts, but only to proof of ''each 
fact which is essen6al to complete a chain of circumstances 
that will establish the defendant's guilt." Although the im-
port of the openiug phrase in CALJIC No. 28 may be some-
what confusing because of the reference to its applicability 
when the People's case rests "chiefly" on circumstantial evi-
dence, it is clearly applicable to cases such as the present 
one, which rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Ac-
cordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
instruction which substantially embodied CALJIC No. 28. 
(See cases collected: Stout on "Appellate Review of Criminal 
Convictions on Appeal," 43 Cal.L.Rev. 381, 446-447.) 
[8] However, the jury here was correctly instructed on 
832 PEOPLE v. WATSON 
No. 21; Penal 
, the law where 
;1 ifferPJJt coustruetiom.; (CAL-TIC 
that circnml'taJJtial evidence of defendant's 
must be inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis 
(CAIJJIC No. 27), and other related matters as above noted. 
Under these circumstances, it does not appear here 
the court's failure to give a further instruction substantially 
in the language of CALJIC No. 28 has "resulted in a mis. 
of justice" within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision as hereinafter discussed. ( Const., art. VI, § ) 
Defendant :finally contends that the court erred in permit-
ting the prosecution, over objection, to develop certain alleged 
collateral matters through his cross-examination, and which 
he claims could have had no purpose except to discredit and 
degrade him. 
[9] The :first point to be considered is the propriety of 
the prosecution's questioning of defendant on the matter of 
his attending a radio-television school. After eliciting on de-
fendant's cross-examination the fact of defendant's attend-
ance, the prosecution continued the questioning by asking 
defendant as to the courses such instruction covered. De-
fendant's objection that such inquiry was incompetent, irrele-
vant and immaterial, as well as beyond the scope of his direct 
examination, was overruled; and his answers indicated that 
his studies there consisted of script-writing, voice projection 
and related matters. While the relevancy of such inquiry 
might be open to reasonable dispute, still it is generally recog-
nized that where ''a defendant takes the stand and makes a 
general denial of the crime with which he is charged, the 
permissible scope of cross-examination is very wide." (People 
v. Z erillo, supra, 36 Cal.2d 222, 228.) [10] Furthermore, on 
direct examination, defendant had been questioned about his 
background, and specifically with regard to his education. 
In response to such interrogation he related his graduation 
from high school, his one semester of college, his training 
with the Maritime Service. Under these circumstances the 
trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution's inquiry 
as to defendant's attendance at radio-television classes. 
Defendant's second point of objection concerns his cross-
examination as to his height and related facts. On direct 
examination, defendant stated that he was 6 feet 6 inches 
talL On cross-examination, the prosecution asked defendant 
about eertain marks on one of the door frames in his apart-
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and to the issue.'' [11] 'I' he but ad-
mitted eYidence was undoubtedly collateral and irrelevant 
to any issue in the case. 'l'he casting of on de-
fendant's reasons for an uniform that he was 
t>ntitled to wear, and evidence to show an attempt 
to from the Army had no bearing on his 
in relation to thr crime 
on collateral matters and apparently no 
other purpose but to defendant has been held re. 
versible error under certain circumstances. v. Ji'lem. 
166 Cal. 357, 383 [136 P. 291, .t~nn.Cas. 1915B ; 
134 Cal. 140, 142 [66 P. 174]; People v. 
76 Cal.App. 178, 184 [244 P. 106].) The question 
nresfmtNl is w·hether the error here requires a reversal 
provisions of article VI, section 4% of the 
Constitution. 
This section, first adopted in 1911 with reference only to 
criminal cases but amended in 1914 so as to apply as well 
to civil eases, now reads: ''No :i~1dgment shall be set aside, 
or new trial g·ranted, in any case, on the ground of mis-
direction of the jury, or of the improper admission or re-
jection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of 
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, 
unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including 
the the court shall be of the opinion that the error 
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of :fustice." 
(Emphasis added.) "While it had long been provided in our 
statutory law that judgments ·would not be reversed because 
of technical errors or defects which did not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant (Pen. Code, §§ 1258, 1404), 
the courts newrtheless in reviewing convictions in criminal 
cases had generally followed the rule that prejudice would 
be presumed from error and upon that basis the defendant 
was "entitled to a reversal of the judgment." (People v. 
Williams, 18 Cal. 187, 194; see also People v. Jrlttrphy, 47 
Cal. 103, 106; Pr'ople v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 119 [17 Am.Rep. 
401]; People v. Ji'urtaclo, 57 Cal. 345, 347; People v. Sansome, 
84 Cal. 449, 451 [24 P. 143] ; People v. Moore, 103 Cal. 508, 
511 fi57 P. 510]; People v. Richards, 136 Cal. 127, 128 [68 
P. 477].) The constitutional amendment added a new con-
cept ealling for a determination by the court that the alleged 
error resulted in ''a miscarriage of justice.'' To this end 
the appellate court vvas required to review the evidence so 
as to form an "opinion" as to whether the assigned errors 
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a reversal under the 
to the terms of section 4¥2 of article VL" 
an exhaustive discussion of the the 
!JL.tU~'-'-V'-'0" were : That the section abro-
the former rule that is from error, 
and allowed the reviewing court to consider the evidence to 
determine whether the error did in fact the de-
fendant; that the distinction between reversible and non-
reversible error does not rest upon the distinction between 
error relating to constitutional rights as contrasted with 
other but that the section applies to both ; that certain 
fundamental however, are guaranteed to the defend-
ant upon which he can insist regardless of the state the 
such as the right to a jury trial and the right to 
ur,ote,ctllOn under the plea of once in jeopardy, but that not 
every invasion of a constitutional right 
reversal; that generally, error involving the 
a constitutional right, like any other error, 
further determination whether the defendant has been 
and the final test is the ''opinion'' of the rt>"tnmmn 
court, in the sense of its belief or conviction, as to the 
of the error; and that ordinarily where the result appears 
and it further appears that such result would have 
been reached if the error had not been vvxu .... cuccvu, 
will not be ordered. Upon this basis, the error 
the 0 case was held not to be cause for r~>"trP.rf~>~ 
also People v. Mayfield (1927), 85 CaLApp. 77 f259 P. 
[12] The controlling consideration in the 
tion is whether the error has resulted in a 
'' In determining the meaning of this 
reviewing courts have stated the test to be applied in 
Emphasis in the main, however, has been 
on the constitutional requirements of a fair trial and due 
process, which emphasis is found in decisions in 
reversals (People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 
787, 
8!)2 
of Criminal Coirdctions on 
consideration to the 
constitutional 
situations it appears that 
be stated as follo-ws: That 
'' should be declared when the 
seems to coincide with 
the afiirmative language used in the constitutional provision. 
0 
a 
f, 
1 
t 
I 
absence of 
any 
upon reason-
upon mere 
the entire purpose of the constitutional 
defeated. 
other-
would 
stated to the record bP-
that it is not 
favorable to defendant would 
have been 
the cross-examination of defendant as to his 
eis(•s and his letter to the authorities.· He 
of both acts to remove any 
effect that otherwise resulted hom the prosecu-
. It does not appear probable that 
was influenced such evidence to defendant's 
or that the admission of such eYidence affected the 
\·erdict. . we are of the as heretofore indi-
that it is not that a result more 
fayorable defendant would haYe been reached in the ab-
seuee of the error in to the additional instruction 
to circumstantial evidence. 'l'he uncontradicted evi-
the condition of the of the deceased 
showed that the deceased met her death during the 
hours that defendant was in the ; and 
this unerringly pointed 
to def(•Hclant 's g·uilt. In short, from an "examination of the 
,J., and McComb, ,J., concurred. 
concurred in the 
the majority opm10n it is 
of a witness added] 
from irrelevant, improper or insulting ques-
... to be examined only as to matters legal and 
to the issue." (See Code Civ. Proc., § § 2065, 
2066.) ·when the "witness" is also the defendant on trial 
for his life or liherty, failure to accord him that specifically 
declared right takes on vastly greater import than where 
the victim of the misconduct is affected only as a witness. 
The majority opinion also recognizes that ''The challenged 
but admitted evidence \vas undoubtedly collateral and ir-
relevant to any issue in the case. The casting of aspersions 
on defendant's reasons for wearing an .Army uniform that he 
was entitled [apparently required] to wear, and offering 
evidence to show an attempt to get a discharge from the 
Army had no bearing on his motive or credibility in relation 
to the crime charged.'' In other words, it is conceded that 
the object and effect of asking the improper questions was 
to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors. 
Technical proof of guilt and effective persuasion of guilt 
may be quite different things. For proof of guilt to sustain 
the verdict on appellate review the prosecution relies upon 
circumstantial evidence which, while not wholly insufficient 
as a matter of law, is far from being overwhelming or even 
satisfyingly convincing as a matter of substance. Many of 
the suspicious circumstances are susceptible of innocent con-
struction. 'l'he finding of guilt rests heavily upon inferences 
drawn in some respects from objective facts and as to other 
elements from opinion evidence. Certainly, resolution of 
the conflicting inferences and of the ultimate fact is for the 
jury, but when the scales of proof are so delicately balanced 
it should be resolved by a jury which has heard relevant 
evidence and which has not been prejudiced and thereby 
persuadecl by irrelevant matters. It seems rather clear to 
me that the natural result of the conceded error was a mis-
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other relevant evidence 
other than those delimited by the .,w,uuan.t"' 
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narration of the 
unfair conduct of the 
rules of 
for the District 
and a correct 
reference is made 
of 
e:sJ,uuJLI£ Justice Peters and concurred iu 
and Fred B. Jr., reported at ( CaLApp. 
For the reasons therein and hereinabove indicated I con-
clude that there has been a miscarriage of justice and would 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In my this ease was correctly decided the 
District First Appellate District, Division 
in an able exhaustive opinion by Mr. 
Presiding Justice Peters and concurred in by Justices 
and Wood. (Cal.App., 288 P.2d 184.) After an exhaustive 
review of the evidence and an able and comprehensive discus-
sion of the contentions of the respective parties, that opinion 
concludes: ""'V e conclude, after reading the transcript, that, 
because we cannot say with conviction that, in the absence 
of the errors complained of, a different verdict would have 
been improbable, the judgment must be and is and 
a new trial ordered.'' 
The of this court concedes, as it must, that nu-
merous errors were committed by the trial court the 
trial of this case, but concludes that such errors were not 
prejudicial to defendant and did not result in a TY>'""'~'""' 
of justice, as that term is used in section 4% of article VI 
of the Constitution of California. 
I have heretofore had occasion to discuss the applicability 
of this constitutional provision to both criminal and civil 
cases dissenting opinions, People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 
2d 590, 604 [290 P.2d 505], and Buekley v. Chadwick, 45 
Cal.2d 183, 203, 208 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d , and I 
will not here take the time to review the authorities or discuss 
their applicability to the case at bar. I cannot refrain from 
stating that I positively do not agree with the of 
the majority here "that generally, error involving the in-
fringement of a constitutional right, like any other error, 
a for the administration of 
this state are to follow if 
ment of law and not of men. 
t,hat before a conviction of 
it is necessary that the constitutional 
which outline the to be 
and it cannot be said that 
established in accordance with law if the accnsrd 
denied any of the the Constitution 
and statutes of this state. 
It is of the framers 
our Constitution was that 
technical errors in instructions to the or in the admis-
sion or of evidence or errors in or pro-
cedure which could not affect the result in a case should not 
be relied upon as a ground for the 
In fact this the 
and I am in full accord ·with this 
where errors 
the substantial 
45 Cal.2d 590, 
obvious that this 
tion has been in recent years 
of conviction may be 
In 
conviction 
affected 
v. Taran-
To my mind it is 
of Constitu-
errors which may have been committed 
court because it was the view of four members of this court 
tha 
of 
cor 
an1 
St 
St 
l'i. 
ANGELITA 
CITY 
24125. In Bank. 
Y. 
